Making further inquiries: policing in context in Brixton and Khayelitsha by Dixon, Bill
1 
 
MAKING FURTHER INQUIRIES: POLICING IN CONTEXT IN BRIXTON AND KHAYELITSHA 
BILL DIXON* 
william.dixon@nottingham.ac.uk 
Only rarely do inquiries into policing investigate the social context within which it takes place.  This 
article looks at two inquiries which chose to take on this task: Lord Scarman’s into the Brixton 
Disorders in London in April 1981; and Justice Catherine O’Regan and Advocate Vusumzi Pikoli’s into 
the current state of policing in Khayelitsha in the Western Cape.  It argues that they should be 
applauded for doing so but draws attention to how difficult it can be to persuade governments to 
address the deep-rooted social and economic problems associated with crises in policing rather than 
focus on reforming the police institution, its policies, procedures and practices. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his book, The Politics of the Police, the British police scholar, Robert Reiner, makes the point that 
‘the police are marginal to the control of crime and disorder’ while ‘public peace and security are 
primarily a function of deeper processes in political economy and culture’.1  He argues that indulging 
in what he calls ‘police fetishism’ - the assumption that the police are the ‘thin blue line’ that 
preserves society from dissolving into a state of violent chaos - is implicit in most if not all public 
discussion of policing, and a good deal of academic writing on the subject too.2   
It is also widely recognised that their relationship with the public – the people who are policed as 
well as those on whose behalf policing is done – is critical to everything that the police do.  This view 
is shared by observers whose perspectives on policing differ sharply in other respects.  Thus the 
‘broken windows’ theorists George L Kelling and James Q Wilson emphasised that scarce police 
resources need to be deployed to support citizens in neighbourhoods at ‘the tipping point’ where 
public order is ‘deteriorating but not unreclaimable’.3  Herman Goldstein, the founding father of 
problem-oriented policing, insisted that the police should focus on problems identified by the 
communities they serve, and seek to mobilise the public in resolving them.4  Writing in 1979 as an 
Assistant Commissioner of London’s Metropolitan Police, John Alderson argued that providing 
‘leadership and participation in dispelling criminogenic social conditions through co-operative social 
action’ was one of ten objectives for police in a free society.5   
Similar considerations are relevant at a societal level. Looking forward to the post-apartheid era in 
South Africa in 1994, John Brewer argued that the legacy of oppressive colonial policing could not be 
overcome in the absence of a wider process of social change.  ‘No amount of police reform’ would, 
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he wrote, ‘alter the nature of police-public relations’ unless the ‘structural inequalities and problems 
of South African society’ were addressed.6 
There is then a large measure of agreement over the need to recognise three things: the limitations 
of the police (and, to be more specific, the public police) as guarantors of order in the face of social 
forces well beyond their control; the centrality of the relationship between the police and the public 
to effective policing; and the urgency of social and economic change if meaningful police reform is to 
be achieved.  So it is surprising how rarely inquiries into policing take account of the social context 
within which policing is done, and attend to the social conditions that gave rise to the issues they 
have been charged with investigating.   
CASE STUDIES 
The purpose of this article is to look at the work of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of 
Policing Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha 
(‘O’Regan/Pikoli’) which attempted to do this, 7 and to compare its efforts to set policing in its social 
context with those of the inquiry into the Brixton Disorders conducted by Lord Scarman in 1981 
(‘Scarman’).8  These two inquiries have been chosen as case studies because, though they took place 
over thirty years apart and focused on policing in cities (Cape Town and London) on different 
continents in countries (South Africa and the United Kingdom) with contrasting, if overlapping, 
histories, they have much in common.  Both were set up in response to what seemed to be a chronic 
breakdown in trust between police and policed (albeit with more or less acute symptoms); and both 
were led by very senior members of the judiciary (one a recently retired judge of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court, the other a serving member of what was then his country’s highest court, the 
House of Lords).   
Scarman was asked to inquire into three days of public disorder on the streets of inner city London in 
which 279 police officers and at least 45 members of the public were injured; O’Regan/Pikoli into 
complaints of inefficiency and a breakdown in relations between the community and the police in 
what apartheid-era administrators liked to call a ‘high density township’.  Both inquiries decided to 
set the policing issues they had been asked to consider in their social context.  O’Regan/Pikoli devote 
one of their report’s 15 chapters to ‘understanding the context of Khayelitsha’; Parts II and VI of 
Scarman’s nine part equivalent are concerned with ‘social conditions’ and ‘the disorders and social 
policy’ respectively.   
The approach adopted by O’Regan/Pikoli, and by Scarman, can be contrasted with the narrower 
scope of inquiries into the fatal consequences of events at the Marikana platinum mine in South 
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Africa’s North West Province in August 2012 and the death of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence 
on the streets of Eltham in south London on 22 April 1993.9  The Marikana Commission of Inquiry, 
chaired by a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Ian Farlam, noted the ‘squalid’ conditions 
prevailing in Nkaneng and other informal settlements around the mine, but was more concerned 
with a forensic dissection of its owner’s obligations to provide housing to its workers under the 
terms of a legally binding ‘social and labour plan’ than with detailed analysis of the workers’ 
circumstances and what might be done to improve them.10 Though it identified ‘institutionalised 
racism’ (of which more below) as an important factor in the Metropolitan Police Service’s 
mishandling of the investigation of his death, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (also led by a retired 
judge) has been criticised by one well-placed observer for failing ‘to place [the murder] in the 
broader historical context of black/police relations’ and disconnecting it from ‘the local contexts of 
racial violence’.11  
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 
Part of the explanation for this unwillingness to explore the social context of policing may lie in the 
nature of commissions of inquiry defined by Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan as time-limited institutions 
external to the executive but set up by a government or a minister at her/his/its discretion and 
charged with the principal task of investigating past events.12  At times of crises, he suggests, 
inquiries are seen as ‘possessing the unique capacity to provide an impartial assessment, and bring 
certainty and closure in situations of doubt and conflict’.13  They serve as ‘instruments of 
accountability and policy learning’.14  But, in doing so, they represent a threat to politicians playing a 
‘high-stake game of political survival’ in which avoiding blame for the event or crisis under 
investigation may be as urgent a priority as finding out what happened, or making sure that it does 
not happen again.15   
For the pragmatic politician establishing an inquiry into an aspect of policing, the advantage of 
limiting its scope to the police - a bureaucratic organisation staffed by a disciplined body of public 
servants - may appear obvious.  Deftly conducted by someone with a suitably safe pair of hands, an 
inquiry may serve to shift the focus of government policy from issues of social structure to what at 
least appears to be a less intractable set or problems to do with the direction and operations of the 
police.  In this ideal world, the police can be both blamed for what went wrong and made 
responsible for putting things right.  Without being too cynical about the motivations of those 
behind the O’Regan/Pikoli and Scarman inquiries it is tempting to see this kind of thinking behind 
the terms of reference they were given, the way those mandates were interpreted and, more 
obviously in the case of Scarman, government’s response to their findings.  The appointment, terms 
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of reference, findings, recommendations and impact of these two inquiries are the subject matter of 
the next three sections of this article. 
APPOINTMENT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE  
The background to the appointment of the O’Regan/Pikoli and Scarman inquires has been referred 
to briefly above.  A little more needs to be said at this point if their appointment, and the task with 
which they were entrusted, are to be understood.   
The O’Regan/Pikoli inquiry was appointed by Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape, on 24 
August 2012 to investigate allegations of: 
a) Inefficiency on the part of the South African Police Service (SAPS) operating from the three 
police stations in Khayelitsha and in the area more generally; and  
b) A breakdown in relations between the Khayelitsha community and member of the SAPS.16  
These allegations had been made by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in 
Khayelitsha.  The NGOs referred to eight cases which illustrated the problems with policing in the 
area.  They ranged from inadequacies in visible policing to shortcomings in the investigation of crime 
(particularly crime committed against foreign nationals, lesbian, gay, transgender and inter-sex 
(LGBTI) people and members of other vulnerable groups) and the response to specific policing 
challenges including illegal liquor outlets, youth gangs, vigilantism and domestic and sexual violence.   
The Commission was appointed under section 1 of the Western Cape Provincial Commission Act 10 
of 1988 and was intended to give effect to powers contained in section 206(3) of the Constitution 
permitting provinces to, amongst other things, ‘oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of the police 
service’ (section (3)(b)) and ‘promote good relations between the police and the community’ 
(section (3)(c)).17  The somewhat fractious relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) 
administration at national level and the opposition-led government of the Western Cape, combined 
with the fact that, under the terms of section 206(1) of the Constitution, policing is primarily but not 
exclusively a national competence, meant that the Commission’s appointment soon became mired 
in political and legal wrangling.  The dispute between the two levels of government was only 
resolved when the Constitutional Court ruled that:  
[W]hilst a province has no control over the policing function, it has a legitimate interest that its 
residents are shielded from crime and that they enjoy the protection of effective, efficient and 
visible policing.  (Moseneke DCJ in Minister of Police and Others v Premier Western Cape and 
Others 2014 (1) SA (CC) at para 37)  
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It was common ground between the parties to the case that, under section 206(5), establishing a 
commission of inquiry was a constitutionally proper way of pursuing that interest and O’Regan and 
Pikoli were eventually permitted to complete their investigation.18  
What is important to note from this is that O’Regan/Pikoli’s mandate was derived from 
constitutional provisions that relate specifically and exclusively to the police.  They were not asked 
to conduct a more broadly based inquiry into whether residents of Khayelitsha were being afforded 
the socio-economic rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) relating to 
housing (section 26), health care, food, water and social security (section 27) and education (section 
29).   
Equally significant is the question of political responsibility for the police, and where the blame for 
any shortcomings in their performance would lie.  The effect of sections 205 – 207 of the 
Constitution, confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Police and Others v Premier 
Western Cape and Others, is that national government in the shape of the Minister of Police ‘must 
determine national policing policy’ (section 206(1)).  The National Commissioner appointed by the 
President must then exercise control over, and manage the police service in accordance with that 
policy (section 207(1) and (2)).  From the point of view of the Premier of the Western Cape, most if 
not all of the blame for any crisis in policing in Khayelitsha that O’Regan/Pikoli might find would lie 
with her opponents in the ANC, and the National Minister of Police in particular.  A wider ranging 
investigation into social conditions for which the Provincial government could also be held 
responsible might prove more awkward but, for the Premier, establishing an inquiry into policing 
must have seemed a relatively safe political bet.  
The constitutional and political background to the appointment of Lord Scarman’s inquiry into the 
Brixton disorders of 10 and 12 April 1981 could hardly be more different. The disorders took place 
almost two years after the election in May 1979, with a majority of 43 seats in the House of 
Commons, of the first Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher.  As Scarman himself 
acknowledged in his report, 1981 was a time of ‘general economic recession’ and the polling 
company, Ipsos MORI, records that, in March of that year, the month preceding the Brixton 
disorders, public satisfaction with Thatcher’s government was at its lowest ebb.19  Britain’s famously 
unwritten constitution, and highly centralised system of government, made it almost inevitable that 
her government would sustain some political damage resulting from an inquiry into the disorders, 
particularly insofar as the social effects of its radical economic policies were implicated in the origins 
of the disturbances.  It may well have been that, by indulging in what Sulitzeanu-Kenan calls a ‘venue 
alteration exercise’, replacing a more volatile critical audience (the media, opposition politicians and 
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the public) with the more predictable one of a judge-led inquiry, the government were merely 
choosing the lesser of two evils.20   
The constitutional position was also relatively clear.  Under arrangements unique to the 
Metropolitan Police, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, was responsible for policing in London 
not just as the government minister responsible for the police nationally, but also as the local police 
authority for the Metropolitan Police district.  These arrangements were to be hotly debated 
throughout much of the next decade but, as things stood in 1981, political responsibility for policing 
in Brixton lay squarely with the Home Secretary.  His response to events in Brixton was to establish 
an inquiry under section 32 of the Police Act 1964 which provided that the Home Secretary ‘may 
cause a local inquiry to be held by a person to be appointed by him into any matter connected with 
the policing of any area’.21  Lord Scarman’s terms of reference were straightforward: ‘to inquire into 
the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make 
recommendations’.22  Though his inquiry was established under legislation providing for the 
governance of the police, he was invited, at least by implication, to range more widely in 
investigating the origins of the disorders.  Unlike O’Regan/Pikoli, Scarman’s terms of reference made 
no explicit, and possibly constraining, references to the police institution.  While the SAPS looms 
large in the mandate of the former, the Metropolitan Police is not mentioned in the appointment of 
the latter.   
FINDINGS 
Scarman’s response to this brief was bold.  He made the case for understanding policing in its social 
context in the introduction to his report in a passage that deserves to be quoted in full: 
Policing policy and methods, it is obvious, reflect in part a reaction by lawfully constituted 
authority to the society which is being policed.  A “Section 32 inquiry” is primarily concerned 
with policing but, because policing methods operate in and are influenced by the social 
situation, it cannot stop at policing.  In this Inquiry, therefore, I have sought to identify not only 
the policing problem specific to the disorders but the social problem of which it is necessarily 
part.  The one cannot be understood or resolved save in the context of the other.23 
Although they were no more responsible for the social and economic problems besetting the 
ethnically diverse communities that live in inner city areas like Brixton than other citizens, the police 
had to ‘adjust their policies and operations ... with imagination as well as firmness’.24  If they did not, 
Scarman feared that ‘disorder [would] become a disease endemic in our society’.25 
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The profound and wide-ranging nature of Scarman’s concerns about social conditions in Brixton was 
evident throughout Part II of his report.26  As he described it, Brixton in 1981 was a once prosperous, 
now decaying, commercial and residential centre with very serious housing problems and a lack of 
recreational facilities appropriate to the needs of young people forced into the idleness that goes 
with unemployment.27 The people of Brixton were more likely to be young, working class and 
transient than in either the rest of London or in the London Borough of Lambeth, the local authority 
area of which Brixton formed (and still forms) part.28  They were more likely to be members of a one-
parent family and to suffer from mental illness or have a mental or physical disability.29  Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly for the debate that swirled around the disorders and Scarman’s response 
to them, Brixton was one of the most ethnically diverse parts of London: 36% of the population of its 
five council wards was ‘non-white’ rising to 49% in two of them.30  Moreover, in the two wards at the 
centre of the disturbances, black people of West Indian or African origin formed 30% of the total 
population but as many as 40% of 0-18 year olds and 50% of those between the ages of 19 and 21.31 
Scarman offered a stark analysis of the state of the black community in Brixton, leading one critical 
commentator to accuse him of adopting a ‘pathological approach’ and downplaying the impact of 
both police and societal racism.32  In summary, he found that British social conditions had fractured 
the extended matriarchal structure of the West Indian family leading to high proportions of children 
finding themselves either in local authority care or in households headed by a lone parent.33  Young 
black people had been failed by the education system and lacked the language and other basis skills 
needed to find work in a technological age.34  Combined with the effects of the ‘general economic 
recession’ and a ‘contraction in the economic and industrial base of the inner city’, this meant that 
young people generally, and black youth in particular, faced unemployment, often for long periods.35 
With the benefit of hindsight, Scarman’s most controversial finding was that, though young black 
people experienced (mainly indirect) discrimination by employers in the work place and elsewhere, 
Britain was not ‘an institutionally racist society’ – at least if that phrase was taken to mean that it 
was one that ‘knowingly, as a matter of policy, discriminates against black people’.36 Summing up, 
Lord Scarman found that the black community in Brixton faced similar problems to those of their 
white neighbours.37  But they were more severe and were exacerbated by racial discrimination.38 
As a result, young black people may feel a particular sense of frustration and deprivation.  
Spending much of their lives on the street, they are there bound to come into contact with 
criminals and with the police.39 
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The police appeared to many young black people ‘as the visible symbols of the authority of a society 
which has failed to bring them its benefits or do them justice’.40  His conclusions on the nature of the 
disorders flowed from this: 
The disorders were communal disturbances arising from a complex political, social and economic 
situation ...  There was a strong racial element in the disorders, but they were not a race riot.  
The riots were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young people against the 
police.41 
O’Regan/Pikoli made much less of their efforts to contextualise policing in Khayelitsha.  Instead of 
explicitly asserting that problems in policing can only be seen as part of a much more extensive set 
of social problems, they assumed that an understanding of context is essential to the successful 
completion of their inquiry.  The sub-headings in the chapter of their report on ‘understanding the 
context of Khayelitsha’ give an indication of the issues they considered: geography, history, 
demographics, social and economic conditions and, finally, crime.42   
The picture of Khayelitsha that emerges is of a place that has varying levels of disadvantage.  It is 
home to almost half a million people over half of whom live in informal dwellings.43  Ethnically and 
linguistically homogenous – 98.7% of residents surveyed for the 2011 census described themselves 
as Black/African; 89.8% spoke isiXhosa at home – over two thirds of adults had been born in the 
Eastern Cape.44  In some of the newer settlements this proportion rose to over four in five.45  Well 
over a quarter of the population was under the age of 15.46 On average, Khayelitsha residents had 
completed no more than nine years of schooling and less than 5% had a tertiary educational 
qualification.47  Over 50% of young men up to the age of 23 were unemployed and three quarters of 
all households had incomes that meant they were unable to meet the cost of food and sustain the 
necessities of life.48  The number of households in Khayelitsha with on-site access to electricity, 
water and a toilet doubled between 1996 and 2011 but sanitation and street lighting remained 
especially contentious issues.49  In spite of a small drop in crime rates per capita since 2003/4, the 
Commission concluded that levels of crime made it unsurprising that ‘a very high proportion of 
residents in Khayelitsha feel unsafe.’50   
In short, ‘[deep] levels of poverty, poor levels of infrastructure and very high crime rates’ made 
policing Khayelitsha ‘profoundly challenging’; it was, the Commission found, ‘a particularly difficult 
place for [the] SAPS to operate [in]’.51  If social and economic conditions provided the background to 
the many inefficiencies in policing identified in their report, O’Regan/Pikoli traced the roots of the 
breakdown in relations between the SAPS and members of the community Khayelitsha’s back to its 
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fiercely contested development in the final days of apartheid.52  The SAPS’s predecessor, the South 
African Police, had been deeply implicated in pursuing the goals of apartheid including the control of 
the ‘influx’ of people from the rural Eastern Cape and in fostering the violence that surrounded the 
creation of their ‘new home’ outside Cape Town.53  
This history imposes a particular burden on SAPS to demonstrate its fairness, even-
handedness and respect for the residents of Khayelitsha in order to win the trust of the 
community.  Unlike in other parts of the world, SAPS cannot draw on a reservoir of good will 
that historical acceptance of the legitimacy of police work creates.54 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPACT 
The extent to which the reports of the two inquiries made recommendations in relation to the 
context of policing reflected the different approaches to presenting their findings.  Scarman devoted 
Part VI of his report to ‘the disorders and social policy’.  He began it by rehearsing why 
‘recommendations about policing ... must embrace the wider social context in which [it] is carried 
out’ before going on to call for a more co-ordinated approach to tackling the problems of Britain’s 
inner cities as well as measures to meet the housing, education and employment needs of ethnic 
minorities.55  He also recommended that ‘positive action’ (defined as ‘special programmes in areas 
of acute deprivation’) be taken to address the problem of racial disadvantage.56   
Far-reaching though his proposals were in some respects, he was careful to avoid saying anything 
about the ‘scale of resources which should be devoted to inner city or ethnic minority needs’.57  This, 
he said, was a matter for government and parliament.58  Reflecting on the response to his report at a 
conference held a year after the riots in April 1982, Scarman offered an upbeat, not to say bullish, 
assessment.  His conclusion about the disturbances having complicated political, social and 
economic roots quoted earlier had been accepted as ‘beyond challenge’ and had ‘become one of the 
unspoken assumptions upon which social and police reforms are discussed and promoted’.59  He was 
pleased with government’s response to the needs of ethnic minorities but disappointed by the 
continued lack of co-ordinated action on inner city problems and uncertain about the fate of his 
recommendation on positive action.60 
Four years later, in 1986, at another conference held after more rioting in British cities the previous 
year, much of Scarman’s optimism had evaporated and he was moved to agree with another 
speaker, Usha Prashar, that his social and economic recommendations had not been implemented.61  
As Stuart Hall commented over a decade later, Scarman’s findings were notable for breaking the 
‘prevailing law-and-order consensus’ over the origins of disorder but the social and economic 
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reforms he had proposed were ‘seriously out of key with the times and [had] triggered no significant 
political or policy response’.62 Worse still, though his advocacy of a community-oriented approach to 
policing had become the dominant philosophy of police leaders in England and Wales by the end of 
the 1980s, his findings on racism failed to stand the test of time and were flatly contradicted in the 
report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry published in 1999.63  This stated that institutional racism 
(defined as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin’) existed not just in the 
Metropolitan Police Service and other police services but in other institutions across Britain.64  
There is no equivalent to Part VI of Scarman’s response to the Brixton disorders in the report of the 
Khayelitsha Commission.  The recommendations set out in Chapter 15 of O’Regan/Pikoli touch on 
some of the problems – vengeance killings and attacks, youth gangs, unlicensed liquor outlets and 
domestic violence - that make policing in the area so challenging.  But their emphasis is very much 
on the style, organisation and delivery of police services by the SAPS: on committing to community 
policing, reviewing the deployment of human resources and adopting a model of policing based on 
procedural justice.   
Reaction to the O’Regan/Pikoli report since it was published on 25 August 2014 had been muted 
until shortly before the anniversary of its publication.  Then, on 7 August 2015, the Premier of the 
Western Cape, Helen Zille, issued a statement giving vent to her frustration at what she evidently 
saw as the failure of the National Minister of Police, Nkosinathi Nhleko, to respond to it, and of the 
SAPS to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Provincial Department of Community Safety 
(DoCS) clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to policing in Khayelitsha.65  
Such a memorandum was, she said, essential to taking action on the majority of O’Regan/Pikoli’s 
recommendations, although progress had already been made on holding elections to Community 
Police Forums (CPFs), providing training to their members, bringing civil society groups together to 
prevent vengeance attacks and creating awareness about crimes against women and children.66    
In her statement, Premier Zille also announced that, having received no response to inquiries about 
the status of a ‘strictly confidential’ response to the Khayelitsha Commission’s work handed over by 
the National Commissioner of the SAPS, General Riah Phiyega, at a meeting on 8 June, she would 
make the document available to the media and the public at large.67  This document, signed by 
General Phiyega and dated 5 June 2015, but issued ‘by direction of the Minister of Police’, contains 
an uncompromising defence of the SAPS.68  It criticises the Commission for adding to negative public 
perceptions of the SAPS and dismisses its work as an unnecessary distraction: ‘The Commission 
highlighted what was already known and buttress [sic] what the SAPS has been talking about all 
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along and dealing with’.69  There is little evidence in the SAPS’s response thus far to suggest either 
that the bitterness surrounding the Commission’s establishment has diminished with the passage of 
time, or that the ANC and national government are prepared to take sole responsibility for the social 
and economic conditions prevailing in Khayelitsha.  On the contrary, General Phiyega notes that, 
[W]hile its mandate was only to investigate policing, the Commission also found that a lack 
of proper investment by the [opposition-run] City of Cape Town and the Provincial 
Government in infrastructure such as toilets, street lights and roads had made policing more 
difficult and increased residents [sic] vulnerability to violent crime.70 
With the Premier of the Western Cape and the National Commissioner (with the Minister, 
apparently, behind her) drawing their rhetorical daggers, the prospects for political consensus over 
the future of policing in Khayelitsha, and how the circumstances under which it takes place might be 
improved, appear bleak.  Yet, if the response to General Phiyega’s’s document drafted by the 
Provincial DoCS is to be believed, relationships on the ground may be rather more productive than 
the political war of words would imply as progress is already being made by DoCS, the SAPS and 
other role-players in turning policing in Khayelitsha around.71  
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this article is that, as Scarman had done over thirty years before, 
O’Regan/Pikoli acknowledged that problems in policing (whether they present as acute in the case of 
Brixton or chronic as in Khayelitsha) are only fathomable if they are set in their wider social context.  
The approaches adopted in the reports of the two inquiries differ: where Scarman emphasised the 
connection between social and economic conditions and policing as a, if not the, guiding principle of 
his work, O’Regan/Pikoli were more understated in their commitment to understanding the context 
of policing.  This may well reflect differences in the salience of policing and the police institution in 
their respective terms of references, but it can also be surmised that these approaches owed 
something to the political conditions under which the inquiries were appointed.  In the light of the 
reticence shown by other inquiries, set up under not dissimilar circumstances, the fact that both 
Scarman and O’Regan/Pikoli chose to address these issues at all is a testament to their willingness to 
seek explanations for poor policing beyond the actions of those responsible for delivering it, and to 
interpret their respective terms of reference in such a way as to permit them to do so.    
What emerged from both inquiries was that people who lack a significant stake in society and feel 
that they get little or nothing from the state are likely to lack the trust and confidence in its agents 
on which public policing in a democratic society depends.  And, at times of crisis, when people’s only 
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point of contact with the state may well be with the police – police that are seen as routinely acting 
against rather than for them - protests against the police and their actions become freighted with 
anger stemming from a much wider set of frustrations and resentments.   
Although he did not say so in quite so many words, Scarman implied that genuine and sustainable 
police reform was impossible if the conditions under which policing was done remained unchanged.   
Reading the conclusions reached by O’Regan/Pikoli on the long shadow cast by the history of 
Khayelitsha, and the extremely testing environment in which the SAPS currently operates, it is hard 
to see them disagreeing.  Yet, if Scarman’s experience is anything to go by, persuading governments 
to rethink their economic and social policies is some way beyond the compass of any ad hoc body 
with a mandate limited to policing.  The complexities of the constitutional and political situation in 
South Africa, with the opposition-led City of Cape Town and Western Cape Provincial Government 
having appointed the O’Regan/Pikoli Commission against the wishes of the ANC, the SAPS and the 
National Minister for Police, make it unlikely that either side in an increasingly bitter war of words 
over its findings and recommendations will be anxious to tackle the contextual issues identified in 
their report.  With political survival at stake, and the diktats of neo-liberalism so firmly implanted in 
the minds of early Thatcherite true-believers and more recent South African converts among the 
ANC and its political rivals in the Western Cape alike, the temptation to tinker with the police 
institution and scratch at the surface of the social problems to which it alone cannot offer a remotely 
adequate response becomes hard to resist.   
* Bill Dixon is Professor of Criminology in the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the 
University of Nottingham.  He would like to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their 
very helpful comments on this article in draft form. 
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